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THE UBS CASE: THE U.S. ATTACK ON SWISS
BANKING SOVEREIGNTY
Beckett G. Cantley*

I. INTRODUCTION
On August 1, 2006, the U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations (PSI), a branch of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, released a report in conjunction with a Senate
hearing that revealed alarming statistics regarding wealthy Americans’
love affair with offshore banking.1 The PSI report culminated in the
subcommittee’s investigation into tax haven abuses, providing the most
detailed look at high-level tax schemes to date.2 The report revealed that
an alarming number of rich Americans are using offshore accounts to
evade taxes, and suggested that law enforcement would be unable to
control the growing misconduct.3 Senator Carl Levin, the PSI Chairman,
stated, “The universe of offshore tax cheating has become so large that
no one, not even the United States government, could go after it all.”4
This investigation marked the first salvo of the federal government’s new
attack on offshore tax evasion. The principal focus of this attack appears
to be unreported offshore bank accounts.5 Due to its stringent banking
laws and its stronghold on foreign money, Switzerland has historically
been considered a bastion for banking secrecy, and a favorite place for
U.S. residents to hold such accounts.6 While there is an existing tax
information exchange agreement (TIEA) between the United States and
*
Beckett G. Cantley (Univ. of Cal., Berkley, B.A. 1989; Southwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, J.D. cum
laude, 1995; and Univ. of Fla., Coll. of Law, LL.M. in Taxation, 1997) is a Visiting Associate
Professor of Law at Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School and a Professor of Law in the Diamond
Program at Thomas Jefferson School of Law. Professor Cantley would like to thank Whitney
Hodges for her work as a research assistant on this article.
1
See generally PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND
GOV’T AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND SECRECY
(2006) [hereinafter TAX HAVEN ABUSES] (released in conjunction with the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations Aug. 1, 2006 Hearing).
2
David Cay Johnston, Tax Cheats Called Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006, at B2.
3
See id.
4
Id.
5
See generally TAX HAVEN ABUSES, supra note 1 (Many of the findings and recommendations
focus on offshore activity, and the first section following the findings and recommendation is a
report detailing “the Offshore Industry.”).
6
See, e.g., Martin Crutsinger, U.S., Switzerland Agree to Crack Down on Tax Evaders, USA TODAY,
June 20, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2009-06-19-us-switzerlandtax-treaty_N.htm (“Swiss banks...hold an estimated $2 trillion dollars in foreign money, and
financial services add about 12% to the country’s economic output. According to the Boston
Consulting Group, these holdings total one-fourth of the world’s foreign-owned assets.”).
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Switzerland—last significantly revised in 2003—a judicial battle has
evolved over the United States’ new efforts to focus its attack on Swiss
accounts and obtaining account-holder information from UBS.7
The policy goals of the United States are clearly legitimate, but the
means of obtaining the information are overreaching given how
vigorously the United States guards its own legal exceptionalism. The
Swiss are understandably concerned that the United States is not
respecting Swiss domestic law. After all, the United States has personal
jurisdiction over its own citizens; therefore, there should be better ways
of obtaining this information while simultaneously respecting the
domestic laws of another sovereign country, especially a friendly country
such as Switzerland. This paper will dissect the intricacies and arguments
surrounding the U.S. attack on offshore banking; discuss the U.S.-Swiss
TIEA; and take a detailed look into the development, policy implications,
and consequences of U.S. v. UBS AG.8
II. IRS OFFSHORE ATTACK
Especially in this time of economic turmoil, the government is
concerned about billions of dollars of lost revenue from unpaid taxes.9
Senator Carl Levin, as Chairman of the PSI, is the U.S. senator leading
the investigations into offshore tax evasion. Not only do the offshore
schemes targeted by Senator Levin and the PSI drastically reduce the
U.S. government’s ability to monitor its citizens’ financial situations, but
they also significantly increase the gap between taxes owed and taxes
paid.10 The U.S. government has a strong interest in uncovering these
schemes. According to Senator Levin, such schemes must be shut down
because they undermine the integrity of the American tax system and
render the government unable to “pay for critical needs, avoid going
deeper into debt, and protect honest taxpayers.”11 Specifically, these tax
schemes “[rob] the [U.S.] Treasury of more than $100 billion each year,
7

See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCX-23-09, TAX COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO OFFSHORE ACCOUNTS AND ENTITIES, at 31-33 (2009)
[hereinafter TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES] (scheduled for a Public Hearing before
the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means on Mar. 31,
2009).
8
U.S. v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV-GOLD/MCALILEY (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2009), dismissed per
stipulation, Agreement Between the U.S. & Swiss Confederation, 2009 WL 2524345 (2009).
9
See generally id. (detailing the government’s effort to collect U.S.-source income tax relating to
offshore accounts).
10
Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS: Testimony
Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Michael Brostek, Dir., Strategic
Issues Team).
11
Sen. Carl Levin, Statement Introducing the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, Part I, TAX ANALYSTS,
Feb. 12, 2007, at 1-2 [hereinafter Levin, Statement].
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and [shift] the tax burden from high income persons and companies onto
the backs of middle income families.”12 Additionally, strict offshore
secrecy rules, such as those implemented by Switzerland, “make it
possible for taxpayers to participate in illicit activity with little fear of
getting caught.”13 These laws permit offshore service providers to engage
in procedures that allow them to go to “extraordinary lengths to protect
their U.S. clients’ identities and financial information.”14 These “perks”
hinder U.S. tax and regulatory authorities in such a way that it is
“difficult, if not impossible, for U.S. law enforcement to get the
information they need to enforce U.S. tax laws.”15
At the G-20 summit in London on April 20, 2009, the United States,
the United Kingdom, France, and Germany each sought to pressure
financial centers worldwide to modify their banking secrecy laws.16
While each country had its own reasons for exerting such pressure, this
part of the paper focuses on the United States’ reasons for seeking to
modify international banking secrecy laws. These reasons include the
discovery of a scheme involving two billionaire brothers that gave
credence to the concerns outlined in the 2006 PSI investigation,17 the
government’s desire to rein in tax evaders through the Voluntary
Disclosure Initiative,18 the inadequacy of international tax examinations
and the Qualified Intermediary (QI) program to enforce tax
compliance,19 and the existence of non-filers associated with foreign
bank accounts.20
A. The Case of the Billionaire Brothers
In September 2006, Forbes ranked Samuel Wyly on its list of richest
Americans.21 Forbes estimated Sam’s net worth to be around $1.1 billion,
earned mostly from investments.22 Sam’s older brother Charles has a
12

See id. at 1.
Id. at 5.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Diana Erbsen et al., IRS Issues Voluntary Disclosure Guidance for Unreported Offshore Accounts
and Entities, TAX UPDATE, Mar. 31, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.dlapiper.com/irs-issuesnew-voluntary-disclosure-guidance-for-unreported-offshore-accounts-and-entities/.
17
See TAX HAVEN ABUSES, supra note 1, at 113-360.
18
Kristen A. Parillo, IRS Streamlines Offshore Disclosure Process, TAX ANALYSTS, July 30, 2009
(Doc. 2009-17268) [hereinafter IRS Streamlines Offshore Disclosure Process].
19
See Brostek, supra note 10, at 7-11.
20
See IRS, FAQs Regarding Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR)—Filing
Requirements, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=210244,00.html (last updated Apr.
28, 2010).
21
Special Report: The 400 Richest Americans, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2006),
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/54/biz_06rich400_The-400-Richest-Americans_Rank_15.html.
22
Id.
13
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personal portfolio almost equal to Sam’s.23 The Wyly brothers, who are
Texan entrepreneurs, are notorious not only for their eye-popping wealth,
but also for the multiple tax evasion investigations they have incurred by
separate federal and state agencies.24
In 2005, Michael’s Stores, Inc. released a statement conceding that
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the New York County
District Attorney were investigating the stock transactions of the Wyly
brothers, the company’s president and vice president.25 However, this
charge was small compared to the investigation revealed in the
previously mentioned 2006 PSI report.26 According to that investigation,
early in the 1990s the brothers set about establishing fifty-eight offshore
trusts and corporations, which they operated for more than thirteen years
without alerting U.S. authorities.27 The brothers set up the trusts in the
name of individual family members, and located them in the Isle of
Man—a noted tax haven.28 To move funds abroad, the brothers
transferred over $190 million in stock option compensation from
publicly traded U.S. companies to offshore corporations, Michael’s being
only one of many.29 When confronted about the staggering amount of
untaxed money, the billionaire brothers “claimed that they did not have
to pay tax on this compensation because, in exchange [for their
investments], the offshore corporations provided them with private
annuities which would not begin to make payments to them until years
later.”30 Meanwhile, the brothers were having their options cashed in and
the proceeds invested without disclosing the transactions to the SEC.31
The PSI traced “more than $700 million in [untaxed] stock option
proceeds that the brothers invested in various ventures they controlled,
including two hedge funds, an energy company, and an offshore
insurance firm.”32 To add insult to injury, the brothers also used the
23

Katie Fairbank & Sudeep Reddy, Billionaire Brothers Under a Microscope: They’re Known for
Gifts to Charities, Politics, but Tax Shelters Scrutinized, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 26,
2006, available at http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2006/08/27/1832755.htm.
24
Press Release, Democratic Nat’l Comm., Another Bad Batch of Bush Money (June 6, 2005)
(available from ProQuest); Brendan M. Case, Selling Secret Accounts Draws Scrutiny: Senate
Report Blasts Dallas Firm for Offshore Services for the Masses, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Aug. 13, 2006, (available from ProQuest) (stating that the brothers are being investigated by the
SEC, a grand jury in Dallas, and a grand jury in New York).
25
See Democratic Nat’l Comm., supra note 24.
26
See TAX HAVEN ABUSES, supra note 1, at 113-360 (providing extensive background and details of
the Wyly case).
27
See Levin, Statement, supra note 11, at 3.
28
See Democratic Nat’l Comm., supra note 24.
29
See Levin, Statement, supra note 11, at 3.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.; see TAX HAVEN ABUSES, supra note 1, at 118.
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offshore trusts to allocate $600 million of untaxed dollars to purchase
real estate, jewelry, and artwork for themselves and family members.33
These personal purchases were made under the pretense that the brothers
“could use offshore dollars to advance their personal and business
interests without having to pay any taxes on the offshore income.”34 The
Wyly brothers were able to carry on these evasive and manipulative tax
maneuvers largely because all of their activity was shielded by the
offshore country’s domestic secrecy laws and practices.35
Despite their funds being offshore, the Wylys directly controlled all
the accounts and assets.36 “[T]he brothers and their representatives
communicated [their] directives to a so-called trust protector who then
relayed these directions to the offshore trustees.”37 These trustees never
rejected a Wyly order nor initiated any action without the brothers’
approval.38 Senator Levin explained that it was simple for these
billionaire brothers to take advantage of a practice dubbed the “Foreign
Trust Loophole.”39 The Wylys’ offshore trustees had “discretion” to
name beneficiaries of the offshore trusts, which were, for paperwork
purposes, companies in the trustees’ countries.40 However, the
application of this discretion had already been determined, since the
trustees had been informed that trust assets were to go to the Wyly
children upon the death of their respective fathers.41 The trustees also
knew they could be replaced if they failed to comply with the Wylys’
instructions.42 Additionally, in accordance with the trust protector’s
orders, the trustees authorized millions of dollars in trust income to be
invested in Wyly businesses and used to purchase personal property for
the Wyly family.43
33

Kelly Fraser & Leah Graboski, “U” Donor Investigated for Tax-Evasion Report, THE MICHIGAN
DAILY, Aug. 6, 2006, available at http://www.michigandaily.com/content/u-donor-investigated-taxevasion-report; see Levin, Statement, supra note 11, at 3.
34
See Levin, Statement, supra note 11, at 3.
35
Id.
36
See id. at 3-4.
37
See id. at 6.
38
See id.
39
Id. at 15; Will Deener, Probe of Offshore Investments Expanding, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
June 4, 2005 (available from ProQuest) (describing the Wylys’ tax evasion scheme thus: “First a
public company grants stock options to a senior executive. The executive then transfers the options
to a trust or partnership controlled by the executive’s family. The parties then structure the transfer
as a ‘sale’ and the trust then ‘pays’ the executive for the options with a long-term or deferred
note…Shortly after the options are transferred, the trust exercises the stock options and sells the
stock in the open market. The executive then takes the position that tax is not owed until the date of
the deferred payment…although the executive has access to the partnership assets.”).
40
See Levin, Statement, supra note 11, at 15.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
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When called by the PSI in 2006, Sam and Charles Wyly stated they
would each invoke their Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination and thus were not asked to testify.44 A statement released
by the billionaire brothers’ attorney, William Brewer, insisted that Sam
and Charles were innocent, stating, “The Wylys believe they have paid
all taxes due.”45
B. Non-Filers with Foreign Bank Accounts
Every United States person who has one or more foreign bank
account(s) that at any point during the year reaches an aggregate balance
of over $10,000 is obligated to file a report with the United States
Department of Treasury listing all foreign accounts.46 Under this
regulation, a “United States person” is any of the following: (1) a citizen
or resident of the United States; (2) a domestic partnership; (3) a
domestic corporation; or (4) a domestic estate or trust.47 “Financial
accounts” include bank accounts, brokerage accounts, mutual funds,
securities, derivatives, financial instrument accounts, and debit and
prepaid credit cards maintained with a financial institution.48 U.S.
investors in offshore hedge funds and private equity funds are also
required to file a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts
(FBAR).49
44

See Johnston, supra note 2, at B2.
Id. (also stating: “And in, any event, as the [PSI] report makes clear, the Wylys were counseled by
an armada of lawyers, brokers, financial professionals, and offshore service providers to ensure that
they were at all times fully meeting their obligations.”).
46
Memorandum from IRS on Report on Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (June 30, 2009),
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=148849,00.html.
47
Id.; Recent Developments Encourage Voluntary Correction of Foreign Financial Bank Account
Reporting Violations, MCDERMOTT NEWSL. (McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Int’l.), Apr. 14, 2009,
available at http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/6eb0672cde23-4242-9312-888af6760b4b.cfm [hereinafter MCDERMOTT NEWSL.] (stating that “[a] United
States person has a ‘financial interest’ in each account for which such person is the owner of record
or has legal title, regardless of whether the account is maintained for the persons’ own benefit or for
the benefit of others (including non-United States persons). The instructions [on the FBAR form]
now provide that the owner of record or holder of legal title includes a corporation in which the
United States person owns directly or indirectly more than 50 percent of the total value or more than
50 percent of the voting power for all shares of stock, and a partnership in which the United States
person owns an interest in more than 50 percent of the profits or more than 50 percent of the capital
of the partnership.”).
48
IRS, Form TD 90-22.1 at 6, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f90221.pdf (stating this
includes savings, demand, checking, and deposit accounts, or any other account maintained with a
financial institution); see MCDERMOTT NEWSL., supra note 47 (“[I]ndividual bonds, notes or stock
certificates and an unsecured loan to a foreign trade or business that is not a financial institution, are
not financial accounts…[C]orrespondent or ‘nostro’ accounts (international interbank transfer
accounts) maintained by banks that are used solely for the purpose of bank-to-bank settlement are
also not considered financial account for these purposes.”).
49
Kristen A. Parillo, Hedge Fund Investors Must File FBAR, IRS Confirms, TAX ANALYSTS, June
29, 2009 (Doc. 2009-14609) at 18 (stating there has been confusion over the rules in recent years).
45
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The failure to file an FBAR or to disclose foreign accounts can lead
to significant civil and criminal penalties.50 Civilly, a person can be fined
up to $10,000 for non-willful noncompliance and up to the greater of
$100,000 or fifty percent of the amount of the underlying account’s
balance at the time of the violation if the noncompliance is determined to
be willful.51 A person can be criminally prosecuted and fined either up to
$250,000 and imprisoned for five years or, if the violation occurred in
tandem with any other U.S. law violation, the individual will be fined
$500,000 and imprisoned for ten years.52 The penalties are also
applicable if a person supplies false information or omits information.53
While the statute authorizes the assessment of the maximum penalty
for violations, the IRS adopted revised FBAR penalty guidelines in July
2008 in an attempt to encourage non-filers to come forward.54 Under this
revision, if the failure to have previously filed the required FBAR was
not “willful,” and the threshold conditions were met, the guidelines
suggest penalties ranging from $5,000 to $15,000, depending on the
particular amounts.55 If a “willful” non-filer meets the same threshold
conditions, penalties can range from five percent to fifty percent of the
maximum balance in the particular account for the year in question.56
The Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, mentioned above, was an additional
IRS step aimed at bringing non-filers into the fold by offering reduced
penalties.57
C. Other IRS Offshore Enforcement Issues

50

Client Alerts, Cooley LLP, Foreign Account Disclosure: Possible June 30 Filing Obligation for
Certain Funds and LPs, TAX UPDATE, June 2009, available at http://www.cooley.com/62717
[hereinafter Foreign Account Disclosure].
51
Workbook on the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR),
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=159757,00.html#penalties (last updated Mar. 30,
2010).
52
Id.
53
See Foreign Account Disclosure, supra note 50, at 2.
54
Philip T. Pasmanik & Neil J. Sullivan, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts:
Significant Revisions and Severe Penalties, THE TAX ADVISER, July 2009, at 462 (on file with
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants); see MCDERMOTT NEWSL., supra note 47
(explaining that the new guidelines have given clarity to those considering voluntary disclosure on
how to proceed).
55
See MCDERMOTT NEWSL., supra note 47 (“The threshold conditions are as follows: “[1] The
person does not have a history of past FBAR penalty assessments…; [2] The money passed through
any of the foreign accounts associated with the person was not from an illegal source nor used to
further a criminal purpose; [3] The person cooperated during the examination…; and [4] The IRS
did not sustain a civil fraud penalty against the person for an underpayment of taxes for the year in
question due to the failure to report income related to any amount in the foreign account.”).
56
Id.
57
See id.
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Despite the Voluntary Disclosure Initiative and several other IRS
initiatives targeting offshore tax schemes, tax evasion and fraudulent
crimes involving offshore entities remain difficult to detect and
prosecute.58 Abusive and evasive offshore tax schemes present
challenges related to the oversight of foreign accounts, the enforcement
of myriad tax laws, the complexity of offshore financial transactions and
relationships among entities, the lack of jurisdictional authority to pursue
information, the specificity of information necessitated by informationsharing agreements, and the difficulties obtaining information from thirdparty financial institutions.59 This Section specifically addresses IRS time
constraints, the Qualified Intermediary (QI) program, and the pending
Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act in Congress.
A major issue for agency enforcement policy is the time constraint
the IRS faces when conducting examinations that include offshore tax
issues.60 By and large, offshore examinations take much longer than do
their domestic counterparts.61 A 2009 U.S. Government Accountability
Office report shows that offshore examinations take, on average, five
hundred more calendar days to develop and examine than do domestic
audits.62 Reasons behind this lag include, but are not limited to, technical
complexity and difficulty accessing information from foreign sources.63
Despite the extra time required, offshore examinations have the same
statute of limitations as domestic examinations, which prevents the IRS
from assessing taxes or penalties more than three years after a return is
filed.64 This often leads to the IRS prematurely ending an offshore
examination or choosing not to open one at all, despite evidence of likely
noncompliance.65 IRS Commissioner Shulman testified that it would be
helpful for Congress to extend the statute of limitations from three years
to six years to assess offshore tax liability.66 However, Congress has yet
to codify this request.67
Another problem for the IRS is the Qualified Intermediary (QI)
program.68 While it is an effective program where properly utilized, it is
58

Brostek, supra note 10, at 7.
Id.
60
Id. at 8.
61
See id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 9.
67
See id.
68
See id. at 10; see also TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES, supra note 7, at 22-25 (“A
QI is defined as a foreign financial institution or a foreign clearing organization, other than a U.S.
branch or U.S. office of such institution or organization, which has entered into a withholding and
reporting agreement (QI agreement) with the IRS. In exchange for entering into a QI agreement, the
59
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insufficient to address all instances of offshore tax evasion.69 Michael
Brostek explains, “Under the QI program, foreign financial institutions
voluntarily report to the IRS income earned and taxes withheld on U.S.
source income, providing some assurance that taxes for U.S. source
income sent offshore are properly withheld and income is properly
reported.”70 Unfortunately, significant gaps exist in the information
available to the IRS about offshore account owners.71 Additionally, a low
percentage of U.S. source income sent offshore flows through QIs.72 In
2003, for example, only about twelve percent of $293 billion in U.S.
income flowed through QIs.73 The rest—about $256 billion—flowed
through U.S. withholding agents, who, unlike QIs that are required to
verify account owners’ identities, are permitted to accept at face value
account owners’ self-certification of their identities.74 The reliance on
self-certification leads to a greater potential for improper withholding
because of misinformation or fraud.75
Due to the extensive number of problems facing the IRS in offshore
tax enforcement, Commissioner Shulman has conceded that “[t]here is
general agreement in the tax administration community that there is no
‘silver bullet’ or one strategy that will alone solve the problems of
offshore tax avoidance.”76 However, despite this grim reality, the IRS has
pursued a number of avenues to get a handle on the situation.77 The
Senate and the House of Representatives have introduced identical bills,
each entitled the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act.78 These bills were in the
QI is able to shield the identities of its customers from the IRS and other intermediaries…in certain
circumstances and is subject to reduced information reporting duties compared to those that would
be imposed in the absence of the agreement. This ability to shield customer information is limited,
however, with respect to U.S. persons, because the QI is required to furnish Forms 1099 to its U.S.
customers if it has assumed primary withholdings responsibility for these accounts, or to provide
Forms W-9 to the withholding agent in cases in which the QI has not assumed such responsibility.”).
69
Brostek, supra note 10, at para. 1.
70
Id. at 10.
71
See id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. (stating that the UBS cases—discussed later in this paper—demonstrate how QIs are
insufficient to eliminate offshore tax evasion).
76
Id. at 11.
77
See id.
78
See generally Press Release, Sen. Carl Levin, Summary of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (Mar.
2, 2009), http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=308949 (Senate Bill 506 and House Bill
1265, proposing to, inter alia, (1) allow the Department of Treasury to impose the same penalties
used when an institution, foreign jurisdiction, or individual is found to be laundering money to any
transaction or entity that the Treasury finds to be impeding on U.S. tax enforcement; (2) authorize
the Secretary of the Treasury to add or remove countries from the list of offshore secrecy
jurisdictions, which are viewed as having secrecy laws or practices that unreasonably restrict U.S.
tax authorities from obtaining necessary information; (3) cause certain non-U.S. corporations, which
are managed and controlled within the United States, to be treated as domestic corporations and
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committee stage of both Congressional Houses, which is the first step in
the legislative process, but as of February 2011 had not become law.79
On its end, the IRS has “both increased the number of [international
audits since November 2008] and prioritized the stepped-up hiring of
international experts and investigators.”80 The IRS is also “exploring
how to improve information reporting and sharing.”81 Because QI allows
important insight into the activities of U.S. taxpayers at foreign banks
and financial institutions, the IRS is continuously looking at how to
improve the QI program.82
D. The Voluntary Disclosure Initiative
The IRS has long had a voluntary disclosure practice, under which
taxpayers may voluntarily disclose non-compliance.83 Although this
practice creates no substantive rights for the taxpayer, it is one factor for
the IRS to consider in determining whether to criminally prosecute the
taxpayer.84 On March 23, 2009, the IRS, in line with the government’s
growing resistance to continued tax evasion as highlighted by the case of
the billionaire brothers,85 announced a new, temporary initiative
specifically targeted at offshore accounts that they hoped would
encourage tax evaders to return to legal activity.86 This new program,
called the Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, significantly lowered the
penalties for unpaid taxes for those individuals or companies that

liable for U.S. corporate income tax; and (4) apply withholding tax to payments with respect to stock
of U.S. corporations to non-U.S. persons of dividend-equivalent amounts and substituted dividends,
which are, arguably, not subject to the 30% withholding tax on dividends paid to non-U.S.
investors).
79
Jennie Cherry & Rashad Wareh, IRS Increases Focus on Offshore Tax Matter, TAX UPDATE (June
4,
2009)
(Int’l
Law
Offices),
available
at
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=330dfbdb-d3e7-48da-bf56th
d08c1ee10f20; see GovTrack, S. 506 [111 ]: Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-506 and GovTrack, H.R. 1265 [111th]: Stop Tax
Haven Abuse Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-1265 (stating that these bills
never became law because the sessions expired before they were enacted).
80
Tax Issues Related to Ponzi Schemes and an Update on Offshore Tax Evasion Legislation:
Hearing Before the S. Fin. Comm., 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Doug Shulman, IRS
Comm’r).
81
See id. at 6.
82
Id. (stating these enhancements include expanding information reporting requirements to include
sources of income for U.S. persons with accounts at QI banks, strengthening documentation rules to
ensure that the program is delivering on its original intent, and requiring withholding accounts with
documentation that is considered insufficient).
83
See Revised IRS Voluntary Disclosure Practice, Tax Crimes General, IRM 9.5.11.9 (June 26,
2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=104361,00.html [hereinafter IRM].
84
Id.
85
See supra Part II.A.
86
IRS Streamlines Offshore Disclosure Process, supra note 18.
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voluntarily disclosed their offshore accounts.87 The program took effect
on March 23, 2009, and initially terminated on September 23, 2009.88 It
was available for all taxpayers with legal source income who made
timely, accurate, and complete disclosures to the IRS, satisfying the
requirements of the Internal Revenue Manual, and paid—or arranged to
pay—the taxes due.89
The IRS’s intent was two-fold.90 First, the IRS hoped to incentivize
noncompliant, eligible taxpayers to become compliant by setting forth a
favorable penalty framework.91 Second, the government hoped to recoup
the lost tax revenue.92 The policy goals behind the initiative included
providing predictable and effective rules to deal with the potentially large
class of noncompliant U.S. taxpayers using offshore accounts without
proper disclosure or tax payments, reducing the difficulty of obtaining
information from offshore banking countries, and satisfying requests for
certainty from tax professionals.93
To reach the agency’s goals, IRS personnel could now apply a new
penalty framework to voluntary disclosure requests of previously
unreported offshore entities and accounts.94 Under the new Voluntary
Disclosure Initiative, the IRS would assess taxes and interest for the six
years prior the voluntary disclosure.95 The taxpayers who took advantage
of the program were required to go back and file or amend all returns for
the applicable period, including filing the FBAR.96 The IRS would assess
penalties, including accuracy or delinquency penalties, on taxes that
87

See id.
Id.
89
Erbsen et al., supra note 16, at 2; IRM, supra note 83 (stating: “(3) A voluntary
disclosure occurs when the communication is truthful, timely, complete, and when: a. the
taxpayer shows a willingness to cooperate (and does in fact cooperate) with the IRS in
determining his or her correct tax liability; and b. the taxpayer makes good faith
arrangements with the IRS to pay in full, the tax, interest, and any penalties determined by
the IRS to be applicable. (4) A disclosure is timely if it received before: a. the IRS has
initiated a civil examination or criminal investigation of the taxpayer, or has notified the
taxpayer that it intends to commence such an examination or investigation; b. the IRS has
received information from a third party (e.g., informant, other governmental agency, or the
media) alerting the IRS to the specific taxpayer’s noncompliance; c. the IRS has initiated a
civil examination or criminal investigation which is directly related to the specific liability
of the taxpayer; or d. the IRS has acquired information directly related to the specific
liability of the taxpayer from a criminal enforcement action (e.g., search warrant, grand
jury subpoena).”).
90
Erbsen et al., supra note 16, at 3.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
See id. at 2.
94
Id.
95
Id. (“except where an account or an entity was formed or acquired within the six-year look-back
period, in which case taxes and interest will be assessed starting with the earliest year in which the
account was opened or acquired, or an entity was formed”).
96
Id.
88
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should have been reported, unless there was reasonable cause to support
the discrepancy.97 The sole penalty that would apply would be a penalty
equal to twenty percent of the foreign account balances in the year in
which the balances were at their highest.98 The penalty could be reduced
to five percent in the case of certain inherited accounts.99
The temporary program, like the ongoing voluntary disclosure
practice, does not guarantee immunity from prosecution, but it is one of
the best methods for taxpayers to minimize the likelihood of criminal
penalties.100 For cases involving unreported offshore income in which the
taxpayer did not use the Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, the IRS is
“instructing [the] agents to fully develop the case pursuing both civil and
criminal penalties, including the maximum penalty for the willful failure
to file an FBAR report and the fraud penalty.”101
In conjunction with this program, the IRS posted a form to its
website that allowed taxpayers to provide the necessary information to be
considered for the Voluntary Disclosure Initiative.102 According to Bruce
Friedland, IRS spokesman, this form was designed to streamline the
process and cut down on the back-and-forth among taxpayers, their
advisers, and the IRS regarding what information is required.103 The
implementation of this form appears to have paid off, as the IRS is
pleased with the initiative’s response.104 Friedland stated that during the
week of July 20, 2009 alone, the IRS received more than four hundred

97
Id. (explaining that an accuracy penalty is twenty percent of the understatement of the tax and a
delinquency penalty is up to twenty-five percent of the net tax required to be shown on the tax
return).
98
Id. at 3.
99
Id. (providing the conditions that must be satisfied to qualify for a reduction, including “(1) the
taxpayer did not open or cause any accounts to be opened or entities formed; (2) there has been no
activity in any account or entity; and (3) all applicable U.S. taxes have been paid on the funds
deposited in the accounts or transferred to the entities (except for taxes on income or earnings of the
account of entity)”).
100
Id. at 2; IRM, supra note 83, at subparagraph (2) (this does not apply to a taxpayer with an illegal
income source).
101
Statement, Douglas Shulman, IRS Comm’r, Conference Call Regarding Voluntary Disclosure
Initiative, (Mar. 26, 2009) (transcript on file with the author) (stating: “Those who truly come in
voluntarily will pay back taxes, interest, and a significant penalty, but can avoid jail time.”).
102
IRS Streamlines Offshore Disclosure Process, supra note 18; Memorandum from IRS on
Offshore Voluntary Disclosures—Optional Format (July 29, 2009) (on file with agency) (the threepage form asks the taxpayer to (1) provide an explanation of the source of the offshore funds; (2)
disclose whether he/she is currently under audit or criminal investigation by the IRS; (3) estimate the
highest aggregate foreign account value and the total reported income for 2003-2008; and (4) list
where the account or asset was located and when the account was opened or closed; (5) explain the
purpose for establishing the account or asset; (6) list each person or entity affiliated with the account
and explain the nature of its relationship to the account; and (7) explain all communications with the
financial institution regarding the account or asset).
103
Memorandum from IRS on Offshore Voluntary Disclosures, supra note 102.
104
See id.
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requests to participate in the program.105 This number represents more
than four times the total number of requests received during 2008 in its
entirety.106
III. THE U.S.-SWISS TAX INFORMATION EXCHANGE
AGREEMENTS
A Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) is a bilateral
agreement between two sovereign countries governing a mutual
exchange of information.107 The goals behind the United States’ initiation
of its tax information exchange program were to assure the accurate
assessment and collection of taxes, to prevent fiscal fraud and tax
evasion, and to develop improved sources for tax matters in general.108
The United States entered a TIEA with Switzerland—a powerhouse
in offshore banking—effective December 19, 1997.109 Article 26 of The
Convention Between the United States and Swiss Confederation for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income
(Convention) provided that the authorities of the two countries would
exchange tax information as necessary for the “prevention of tax fraud or
the like in relation to taxes which are subject …” to the Convention.110
This exchange of information included both civil and criminal matters.111
This Section looks at the 2003 changes to the Convention112 followed by
a discussion of the policy behind updating the TIEA.113
A. The 2003 Changes
105

Id.
Id.
107
See TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES, supra note 7, at 54.
108
See id. at 55.
109
See Client Alert, Baker & McKenzie LLP, Switzerland and United States Sign Tax Information
Exchange Agreement, (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.bakernet.com/NR/rdonlyres/4938F894564E-45D8-8DD507A5E7D5FCDE/29591/SWITZERLANDANDUNITEDSTATESSIGNTAXINFOEXCHAN.pdf
[hereinafter Tax Information Exchange Agreement].
110
Id. at 1.
111
See id.
112
Press Release, U.S Dep’t of the Treas., Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, Regarding the
Admin. of Article 26 (Exchange of Information) of the Swiss-U.S. Income Tax Convention of
October 2, 1996, (Jan. 23, 2003) available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/mutual.aspx [hereinafter Mutual Agreement]; see generally Tax Information
Exchange Agreement, supra note 109 (outlining changes to the Convention).
113
See Tax Information Exchange Agreement, supra note 109, at 1; see generally Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of the Treas., Office of Public Affairs, Treasury Announces Mutual Agreement with
Switzerland Regarding Tax Information Exchange (Jan. 24, 2009) available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/kd3795.aspx (including the text of the
Mutual Agreement, Letter from Acting Treasury Secretary Kenneth Dam, and Letter from Swiss Fin.
Minister Kaspar Villiger).
106
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Controversy surrounded the definition of “tax fraud” almost
immediately upon inception of the Convention.114 Under Swiss law, tax
fraud generally occurs only when documents are forged or falsified, or
when there is a scheme of lies to deceive tax authorities.115 The United
States has a more liberal view of what tax fraud entails, including things
such as the failure to file a tax return or omission of certain income from
a return.116 The changes employed under the 2003 mutual agreement lean
toward the more liberal American view.117
On January 23, 2003, the U.S. and Swiss authorities entered into a
mutual agreement that established new guidelines on how to properly
implement the Convention.118 The agreement was intended to clarify
what behaviors constituted “tax fraud” by outlining fourteen hypothetical
situations where tax fraud is recognized.119 This list was not meant to be
exhaustive and only provides basic guidelines for each country’s
constituents and financial institutions.120 The countries also agreed upon
six “understandings.”121 The first understanding emphasizes both
countries’ renewed efforts to work together to the greatest extent possible
to support the tax administration of both countries.122 The second
understanding states that when information is requested, the statute of
limitation of the requesting party applies.123 The third understanding
allows information to be requested for both criminal and civil
penalties.124 The fourth understanding sets forth three examples, provided
for in the original agreement, that establish when a country can request
information if it is believed or suspected that there is tax fraud being
committed.125 The fifth understanding stipulates that each country will
share information when the other country has a “reasonable suspicion”
that certain conduct would constitute fraud.126 The sixth understanding

114

See Tax Information Exchange Agreement, supra note 109, at 1.
Id.
116
See id.
117
See id. at 2.
118
U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., supra note 113.
119
See Mutual Agreement, supra note 112, at 3-10.
120
See id.
121
Id. at 1-2.
122
Id. at 1.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1-2.
125
Id. at 2; Tax Information Exchange Agreement, supra note 109, at 1 (these examples include “(a)
conduct established to defraud individuals or companies, even though the aim of the behavior may
not be to commit tax fraud; (b) conduct that involves destruction or non-production of records, or the
failure to prepare or maintain correct and complete records; [and] (c) conduct by a person subject to
tax in the requesting State that involves the failure to file a tax return that such person is under a
legal duty to file, or an affirmative act that has the effect of deceiving the tax authorities”).
126
Mutual Agreement, supra note 112, at 2.
115
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states that these preceding examples will constitute tax fraud under
Article 26 of the Convention.127
B. Policy Behind Updating the TIEA
TIEAs, entered into mutually, can foster advantageous symbiotic
relationships.128 Many countries, including the United States and
countries within the European Union, believe that Switzerland is a
hotbed for maintaining abusive tax avoidance, and that its secrecy laws
prevent other countries from effectively combating tax fraud.129 Changes
to the agreement could help Switzerland shake off the recent bad press
regarding how its secrecy laws are causing other countries to lose
hundreds of millions of dollars in tax revenue.130 Instead of vigorously
prosecuting offshore fund holders, a renewed faith in the Swiss banking
system could encourage other countries to promote offshore banking,
allowing Switzerland to maintain its status as an epicenter of banking.131
Concurrently, updates to the convention will help the United States
increase its surveillance abilities, assist in closing its tax gap, fulfill its
TIEA program goals, and recoup millions in lost tax revenue.132
Enacted changes could facilitate more effective tax information
exchange between the United States and Switzerland.133 However,
despite intentions to improve information sharing, changes may affect
how business in Switzerland is run with respect to U.S. and other foreign
taxpayers. Any change has the potential to disrupt the cultural landscape
of a country that prides itself on banking secrecy and financial security.
IV. THE UBS CASE
UBS AG (UBS), based in Switzerland, is one of the largest financial
institutions worldwide.134 Effective January 1, 2001, UBS voluntarily
entered into a QI agreement with the IRS.135 Like in most U.S. QI
agreements, UBS agreed to identify and document any customers who
held U.S. investments or received U.S. source income in accounts
127

Id.
See U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., supra note 113.
129
See Andrea Coombes, UBS Case Could Be Major Victory for IRS, MARKETWATCH.COM, July 11,
2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ubs-case-could-be-major-victory-for-irs.
130
See id.
131
Id.
132
See id.
133
See U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., supra note 113.
134
See TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES, supra note 7, at 2.
135
Id. at 31; Brostek, supra note 10, at 10.
128
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maintained with UBS.136 If a U.S. customer refused to be identified under
the QI agreement, UBS was required to apply a backup withholding tax
at a twenty-eight percent rate on payments made to the customer.137
Further, UBS was to bar the customer from holding any U.S.
investments.138 Eventually, UBS failed to uphold its end of the agreement
and the U.S. government felt compelled to bring judicial action.139
This Section addresses why UBS became the linchpin in the U.S.
attack on bank accounts promoting tax evasion.140 It outlines the
procedure taken against the bank in terms of both criminal and civil
judicial action141 and the policy issues surrounding the litigation.142
Finally, this Section dissects the outcome of the most current civil
litigation facing UBS.143
A. Why UBS?
On July 17, 2008, the PSI, still adamantly focused on the fight
against tax evasion, released a staff report entitled Tax Haven Banks and
U.S. Tax Compliance (2008 PSI Report).144 This report, as damning to
U.S. offshore tax enforcement as was the 2006 PSI report, revealed that
many of UBS’s American clients refused either to be identified, to have
taxes withheld, or to sell their U.S. assets as required under the standing
2001 QI agreement.145 In order to retain the high volume of wealthy U.S.
customers, UBS bankers assisted the U.S. taxpayers in concealing the
ownership identity of the assets held in offshore accounts by helping to
create nominee and sham entities in various non-U.S. jurisdictions. These
entities were then claimed to not be subject to reporting requirements
specified under the QI agreement.146 The report alleges that UBS not
only assisted in these tax-evasion schemes, but also purposefully

136

See TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES, supra note 7, at 31.
See id.
Id.
139
U.S. v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV-GOLD/MCALILEY (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2009), dismissed per
stipulation, Agreement Between the U.S. & Swiss Confederation, 2009 WL 2524345 (2009). See
generally STAFF REPORT, S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, Tax Haven Banks and
U.S. Tax Compliance, (2008) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT] (released in conjunction with the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations July 17, 2008 Hearing).
140
See generally Brostek, supra, note 10; STAFF REPORT, supra note 139.
141
See generally Brostek, supra, note 10; STAFF REPORT, supra note 139.
142
See Pascal Fletcher & Lisa Jucca, UBS, U.S. Settle Tax Evasion Case, REUTERS, Aug. 12, 2009,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/12/ubs-tax-idUSN129606820090812.
143
See id.
144
See generally STAFF REPORT, supra note 139.
145
Id. at 10.
146
Id.
137
138
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marketed the strategies to wealthy Americans.147 The 2008 PSI report
documented that the United States loses around $100 billion annually to
offshore tax evasion.148 According to the U.S. Senate and U.S.
Department of Justice prosecutor’s investigation, U.S. clients hold about
nineteen thousand accounts at UBS, containing an estimated $18-20
billion in assets.149
Shortly following the release of this information, Bradley Birkenfeld,
an American citizen and a UBS Geneva-based director of wealthy
American clients with offshore accounts from 2002-2006, pleaded guilty
to the charge of helping American billionaire Igor Olenicoff evade
millions of dollars in federal taxes.150 Birkenfeld’s testimony
compounded UBS’s precarious situation.151 Specifically, the former
director testified that UBS bankers used a variety of ruses to court
American clients and to help them dodge taxes.152 UBS advised bankers
traveling to the United States to tell airport customs agents that the trip
was for pleasure and not business.153 Additionally, the bank urged clients
to destroy banking records to conceal their offshore accounts.154 Some
American clients were even instructed to “stash” watches, jewelry, and
artwork bought with money hidden offshore.155 UBS went so far as to
encourage clients to use Swiss credit cards so the IRS could not track
purchases.156 Birkenfeld further stated that in his official position he
served as a courier for his clients, getting checks out of the United States
and depositing them in accounts in Denmark, Switzerland, and
Liechtenstein.157 He testified that he knew he was breaking the law but
did so because of the “incentives” UBS offered him.158 Birkenfeld’s
cooperation with the government in the formative stages of the UBS case
was vital to the U.S. Federal Government’s tax evasion inquiry.159
B. The Case
147
See id. at 17; Evan Perez, Moving the Market: Offshore Tax Evasion Costs U.S. $100 Billion,
Senate Probe of UBS, LGT Indicates, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2008, at C3.
148
See Perez, supra note 147.
149
STAFF REPORT, supra note 139.
150
Lynnley Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Please Guilty in Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, at
C1.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
See id.
154
See id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
See id.
158
Id. (stating these incentives came in the form of large bonuses).
159
See id. (“Birkenfeld’s testimony, the centerpiece of a widening investigation into UBS and its
wealthy American clients, blew a hole in the wall of secrecy surrounding the world of Swiss
banking.”).
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A little less than a month prior to the 2008 PSI report’s release, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation made a formal request to travel to
Switzerland to probe a multi-million dollar tax evasion case involving
UBS.160 The UBS fallout subsequently progressed at a furious pace.161 At
the 2008 PSI hearing, held in conjunction with the 2008 PSI Report,
Mark Branson, CFO of UBS Global Wealth Management and Business
Banking, testified that, in fact, compliance failures might have occurred
at UBS.162 He pledged that UBS would take progressive action to ensure
that the activities identified in the 2008 PSI Report would not
continue.163 He stated that UBS would no longer provide offshore
banking services to U.S. customers.164 Instead, such customers would
only be provided services through U.S.-licensed companies.165
Additionally, UBS would no longer permit Swiss-based advisors to
travel to the United States to meet with U.S. customers.166 Branson
further pledged that UBS would comply with a John Doe summons
relating to the UBS accounts held by U.S. residents.167
The following day, on July 18, 2008, a federal district court in
Florida granted the IRS permission to issue a John Doe summons to UBS
seeking the names of as many as twenty thousand U.S. citizens who were
UBS customers that failed to meet reporting or withholding
obligations.168 However, UBS’s legal troubles did not end there.169
Through a press release, UBS confirmed on November 12, 2008, that
Raoul Weil, Chairman and CEO of UBS Global Wealth Management
160
Ass’n of Fin. Prof., FBI to Probe Swiss Bank in UBS Tax Dodging Case, (June 22, 2008),
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jTfwAG7pDZAUUS8_feZQgnnHAeaQ.
161
See Lynnley Browning, A 2nd Inquiry Hits UBS, Pressed for 52,000 Names, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2009, at B1 [hereinafter Browning, A 2nd Inquiry Hits UBS]; Andrew R. Sorkin, U.S. Sues UBS to
Disclose
Customers
Names,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
19,
2009,
http://dealbook.
blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/us-sues-ubs-to-disclose-customer-names/.
162
United States Senate: Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance, Testimony before the S.
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 2
(2008) (statement of Mark Branson, CFO of UBS Global Wealth Mgmt. & Swiss Bank Member of
the Grp. Managing Bd.).
163
See id.
164
Id.
165
See id.
166
See id.
167
Id.
168
See Levin, Statement, supra note 11, at 17 (explaining that a John Doe summons is a tool used by
the IRS in recent years to uncover taxpayers in offshore tax schemes. It is an administrative IRS
summons used to request information in cases where the identity of the taxpayer is unknown. To
obtain approval of the summons, due to the IRS’s inability to serve the taxpayer, the IRS must show
the court, in public filings to be resolved in open court, that: (1) the summons relates to a particular
person or ascertainable class of persons, (2) there is a reasonable basis for concluding that there is a
tax compliance issue involving that person or class of persons, and (3) the information sought is not
readily available from other sources.).
169
Press Release, UBS AG, Statement on Indictment of UBS Executive (Nov. 11, 2008), available
at http://www.ubs.com/1/e/investors/releases?newsId=157836.
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and Business Banking and member of the Group Executive Board, was
indicted by a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida in
connection with the U.S. Department of Justice’s ongoing investigation
of UBS’s U.S. cross-border business.170 Weil was subsequently relieved
of his position with the company.171
Seemingly in order to put an end to U.S. judicial action, UBS entered
into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the U.S. Department of
Justice on February 18, 2009.172 UBS, as part of the agreement, agreed to
pay $780 million in fines, penalties, interest, and restitution for
defrauding the U.S. government by helping U.S. taxpayers hide assets
through UBS accounts held in the names of nominee or sham entities.173
Two hundred million of the $780 million penalty was to be paid to the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to settle the charge of “acting
as an unregistered broker-dealer and investment advisor” and
enforcement action against the bank.174 Pursuant to the agreement, UBS
waived the indictment and consented to the filing of one criminal count
charging UBS with conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government and the
IRS in violation of U.S. criminal law.175 The U.S. government agreed to
recommend dismissal of the charge if UBS met all monetary and other
obligations under the Deferred Prosecution Agreement.176 In an
unprecedented move made to satisfy the agreement obligations, the
Swiss Financial Markets Supervisor Authority disclosed to the U.S.
government the identities of, and account information for, about two
hundred and fifty U.S. customers of UBS’s cross-border business.177
The ink had barely dried on the Deferred Prosecution Agreement
before the U.S. government filed a civil suit on February 9, 2009 in a
Miami federal district court against UBS to reveal the names of as many

170

See id.
See Carlyn Kolker & Ryan J. Donmoyer, UBS Executive Weil Charged by U.S. in Tax
Conspiracy,
BLOOMBERG,
Nov.
12,
2008,
available
at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601208&sid=
a9920BUoGuF4.
172
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, UBS Enters into Deferred
Prosecution Agreement (Feb. 18, 2009), available at www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-tax136.html. See Brostek, supra note 10, at 10. See generally U.S. v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIVGOLD/MCALILEY (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2009), dismissed per stipulation, Agreement Between the
U.S. & Swiss Confederation, 2009 WL 2524345 (2009).
173
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 172. See Brostek, supra note 10, at 10. See generally U.S. v.
UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV-GOLD/MCALILEY (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2009), dismissed per
stipulation, Agreement Between the U.S. & Swiss Confederation, 2009 WL 2524345 (2009).
174
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 172 (stating that UBS also consented to the issuance of a
final judgment that permanently enjoined the bank).
175
See TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 7, at 32.
176
Id.
177
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 172.
171
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as fifty-two thousand American customers.178 The Justice Department’s
lawsuit alleged that the bank and the customers had conspired to defraud
the IRS and the U.S. Federal Government of legitimately-owed tax
revenue.179 The suit further alleged that the indicated customers had
32,940 secret accounts containing cash and 20,877 accounts holding
securities.180 The suit claimed that Swiss-based bankers actively
marketed UBS’s services to wealthy U.S. customers within U.S.
borders.181 Specifically, the government claimed that U.S. contacts
occurred through UBS-sponsored sporting and cultural events that
targeted wealthy Americans.182 UBS documents filed with the lawsuit
show that UBS bankers came to the United States to meet with U.S.
clients almost four thousand times a year, a clear violation of U.S. law.183
The government stated that the bank trained its officers to avoid
detection by U.S. authorities.184 In addition to the suit, the United States
asked a federal judge to enforce the John Doe summons served upon
UBS in July of 2008.185
UBS, backed by the Swiss government, emphatically indicated it
would withhold the names, calling the U.S. demand a “fishing
expedition” that would breach bilateral tax agreements and Swiss bank
secrecy laws.186 The bank believed it had a substantial defense to the
enforcement of the John Doe summons and vocalized its intent to
vigorously contest the enforcement of the summons in the civil
proceeding, as permitted under the terms of the Deferred Prosecution
Agreement.187 UBS claimed that the IRS’s summons sought information
regarding a substantial number of undisclosed accounts maintained by
U.S. citizens at UBS in Switzerland, whose information is protected by
Swiss financial privacy laws.188 As breaching confidentiality is a criminal
offense in Switzerland, to comply with the IRS’s summons would mean
178

See Sorkin, supra note 161.
Id.
180
See David Voreacos & Carlyn Kolker, U.S. Sues UBS Seeking Swiss Account Customer Names,
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 19, 2009, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=axZmpp36b_OA &refer; Browning, A
2nd Inquiry Hits UBS, supra note 161.
181
See Janet Levaux, UBS to Fight IRS Search of 52,000 Accounts, RESEARCH MAGAZINE, Feb. 19,
2009, available at http://www.researchmag.com/News/2009/2/Pages/UBS-to-Fight-IRS-.aspx.
182
See id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
See Browning, A 2nd Inquiry Hits UBS, supra note 161.
186
Fletcher & Jucca, supra note 142.
187
See Levaux, supra note 181; U.S. v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV-GOLD/MCALILEY (S.D. Fla.
July 9, 2009), dismissed per stipulation, Agreement Between the U.S. & Swiss Confederation, 2009
WL 2524345 (2009).
188
See UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV-GOLD/MCALILEY.
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Swiss UBS employees would have to violate domestic law, resulting in
criminal prosecutions in Switzerland.189 In response to the summons, the
Swiss’s People’s Party called for retaliation against the United States and
for urgent debate in Parliament on ways to protect Swiss banking secrecy
from “further foreign blackmail.”190
On March 4, 2009, the PSI held another hearing, called the Tax
Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance—Obtaining the Names of U.S.
Clients with Swiss Accounts (2009 PSI Hearing), directed at enforcing
UBS compliance with the John Doe summons.191 According to John
DiCicco, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Tax Division of the
U.S Department of Justice, UBS’s challenge to the government’s motion
to enforce the John Doe summons, including an appeal from an adverse
ruling, would not be considered a breach of the previously signed
Deferred Prosecution Agreement.192 However, if on completion of
litigation the Court were to order UBS to produce the documents sought
and hold UBS in contempt for failure to do so, UBS’s noncompliance
may be determined to be a material breach of the Deferred Prosecution
Agreement.193 If this were found to be the case, the U.S. government
would be permitted to proceed with the criminal prosecution of UBS.194
Mark Branson also testified at the 2009 PSI Hearing, but in support
of UBS.195 Branson addressed the progress UBS had made under the
requirements of the agreement.196 He stated that UBS had sought to
comply with the John Doe summons without violating Swiss domestic
law.197 According to Branson, Swiss privacy law prohibited UBS from
producing responsive information located in Switzerland, which is why
UBS had only been able to produce information responsive to the
summons that was located in the United States.198 Branson stated that it
was his belief that UBS had currently complied with the summons to the
fullest extent possible without subjecting its employees to criminal
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See id.; Katharina Bart, 5th Update: Swiss Govt Discusses UBS Vs IRS at Special Mtg, DOW
JONES NEWSWIRES, Aug. 10, 2009 (available from Dow Jones Factiva).
190
Swiss Party Wants to Punish U.S. for UBS Probe, REUTERS, Feb. 21, 2009, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/02/21/swiss-usa-idUSTHO15017420090221 .
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prosecution in Switzerland.199 He then emphasized that the United States’
continued pressure to enforce the summons would be a violation of the
original 2001 QI agreement and the income tax treaty between the two
countries.200
This warning did not halt U.S. advances in seeking this
information.201 On March 18, 2009, the Department of Justice extended
its investigation into UBS offshore tax fraud to include independent
attorneys and accountants in Switzerland and the United States.202 Of
three individuals currently under investigation, one is a Zurich-based
accountant who runs a boutique finance and trust company,203 and two
are brothers who are attorneys at a law firm located in Zurich and
Geneva.204 A criminal case is being built against these individuals, who
are each suspected of having traveled with Swiss UBS bankers to the
United States to work with American clients to evade U.S. taxes.205 On
April 2, 2009, Steven Rubenstein of Boca Raton, Florida became the first
U.S. citizen arrested in connection with the tax probe of UBS, allegedly
hiding assets at UBS in order to avoid tax collectors.206 Rubenstein—a
yacht company accountant—deposited more than $2 million in
Kruggerrand gold coins into his UBS accounts and bought securities
worth more than 4.5 million Francs.207 He is also accused of meeting
with UBS Swiss bankers in several locations around South Florida from
2001 to 2008.208 On August 10, 2009, Rubenstein signed a plea
agreement with the Department of Justice consenting to these charges in
exchange for lowered sentencing guidelines.209
Fuel was added to the fire when Jeffrey Chernick of Stanfordville,
New York, a representative for Hong Kong and Chinese toy
manufacturers, pleaded guilty on July 28, 2009 to filing a false tax return
by hiding $8 million through offshore accounts with UBS and another
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unnamed Swiss bank.210 Chernick testified that for the past decade, he
had used offshore accounts in the two banks expressly to avoid
taxation.211 According to Chernick, the Swiss bankers removed his name
and account numbers from his offshore account statements and lied to
U.S. customs agents regarding their reasons for traveling to the United
States.212 He also testified that there was a $45,000 bribe allegedly paid
to a Swiss official on Chernick’s behalf in order to obtain information on
the U.S. investigation into UBS.213 Court records document the
extraordinary lengths Chernick went to avoid detection, including setting
up a sham $700,000 loan between his company and a second Hong Kong
entity to repatriate funds into the United States to purchase property for
his home in New York.214
C. Outcome
With the trial date fast approaching, the U.S. government and UBS
reported in a status conference meeting with U.S. District Judge Alan
Gold that they had reached an “agreement in principle.”215 Terms were
not immediately announced, and Judge Gold stated the parties would
likely present a written breakdown at the August 7 status conference
meeting with a final agreement to be approved by the court shortly
thereafter.216 In accordance with the latest development, Judge Gold
pushed the hearing date back to August 10 to give U.S. and UBS
negotiators time to finalize a tentative agreement.217
Swiss media reports from July 26 indicated U.S. negotiators
expressed a willingness to accept data on a reduced number of accounts
held by U.S. citizens.218 Under this reported plan, UBS would be
required to reveal data only if the client had been visited by Swiss
bankers outside the United States.219
On August 12, 2009, the parties initialed a more substantive
agreement, acknowledging it would “take a little time” to sign this
210
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agreement in a final form.220 Lawyers involved in the case said the
settlement could involve the disclosure of three thousand to more than
ten thousand names of American clients suspected of using offshore
accounts to evade taxes.221 Swiss banking authorities could disclose the
names of investors in those accounts without breaching the country’s
banking secrecy regime, which expressly carves out an exception for
cases involving fraud.222 This “fraud exception” was the same principle
cited when the bank previously disclosed the names of about two
hundred and fifty UBS clients in conjunction with the Deferred
Prosecution Agreement.223 Additionally, leaked details of what would be
in the finalized agreement indicated that the UBS-U.S. settlement may
prevent a monetary penalty from being levied against the bank.224 This is
welcoming news to many investors who feared UBS would have to pay
several billion dollars to settle the dispute.225
V. ANALYSIS
Switzerland, normally considered a bastion of banking secrecy, has
come under heavy pressure from the United States, Germany, France,
and Britain to improve practices relating to the enforcement and
punishment of tax evaders.226 In response to this pressure, this Section
addresses the changes to the current U.S.-Swiss TIEA,227 the future of
Swiss banking privacy law and how it will affect U.S. offshore banking
activity,228 and the character of policy decisions.229
A. Likely Changes to the U.S.-Swiss TIEA
Changes were bound to be made to the U.S.-Swiss TIEA given the
enormous amount of civil and criminal litigation involving Swiss banks,
coupled with the U.S. government’s unyielding commitment to eliminate
220
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abusive offshore tax schemes and offshore accounts which lead to gross
tax evasion.230 According to a June 19, 2009 Department of Treasury
press release, the United States and Switzerland governments had
concluded negotiations on an amended tax treaty.231 The countries were
then expected to sign the protocol within a few months’ time,232 once
Swiss business and local governments were given the chance to comment
on the proposed changes.233 Switzerland’s Federal Council and
Parliament will decide if the new agreement is permitted to take effect.234
The Obama Administration is focused on pushing initiatives to close
loopholes that have allowed U.S. investors to evade taxes using offshore
havens, signaling this amendment stands a good chance of being enacted
by U.S. lawmakers.235 The amendments would revise the existing U.S.Swiss treaty to allow for a greater exchange of information as permitted
by a model tax convention adopted by the Paris-based Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).236
B. Future of Swiss Banking Privacy Vis-à-Vis The United States
The United States’ case against UBS has strained relations between
the United States and Switzerland because of the blatant challenge to
Switzerland’s diligently guarded banking secrecy laws.237 While the
settlement could be viewed as good news for UBS regarding the U.S.
legal battleground, the bank could be facing an attack on the home front
when the dust finally settles in America.238 In disclosing names, UBS
could face more civil suits from account holders claiming that UBS
violated Swiss bank secrecy laws by including their names and account
information in any disclosure.239 UBS employees may also face criminal
prosecution under Swiss law for breaching confidentiality.240 All of this
is likely to cause significant political backlash in Switzerland to defend
its sovereignty, especially as it relates to the United States.
The banking sector is such a large employer in Switzerland, and such
a strong source of pride among the Swiss population, that no Swiss
230
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government can eliminate these laws without severe political
repercussions. As such, the political system is likely to continue to
respond to the rising political pressure in Switzerland to defend its
sovereignty and its domestic banking secrecy laws. Swiss Foreign
Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey understands this, and, in response to the
UBS litigation, stated, “It is about Switzerland’s sovereignty. We want
our laws to be respected. It is also about our financial centers and about
jobs.”241 Thus, the government will likely continue to strengthen its bank
secrecy violation penalties on the one hand, while on the other doing as
little as possible to placate the United States with respect to U.S. citizens
with unreported Swiss accounts.
The Swiss judicial system is also very likely to take umbrage to the
United States’ attempt to abrogate its laws. The reaction could include
strict and severe enforcement of bank secrecy violation penalties and
criminal sentences. Historically, the Swiss judiciary has often looked at
the application of U.S. laws by U.S. judges to U.S. citizens doing
business in Switzerland as interference with domestic sovereignty, rather
than a proper application of U.S. laws. However, where a U.S. case has
involved the fraudulent conduct of a wealthy American citizen, the Swiss
Courts have been somewhat compliant. In this case, the United States is
seeking to enforce its laws in Switzerland on American citizens who
have properly obtained their wealth, but who have fraudulently not
reported such wealth for U.S. tax purposes. As such, the United States is
attempting to broaden the Swiss idea of fraud beyond what Swiss courts
would normally consider under their definition of “fraud.” The Swiss
courts are very likely to push back against such a broad application.
C. Is this Good Policy?
This litigation is likely to create changes to offshore banking
opportunities and banking secrecy laws in addition to the revised U.S.Swiss TIEA. The United States appears to have changed the status quo.
The question remains whether this outcome reflects sound policy. This
Section discusses the effects of this policy, both in terms of interfering
with another country’s sovereignty,242 and the true purpose and effect of
bringing the UBS case.
i. Meddling in other countries’ sovereignty
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The United States today seems to interpret its national interest in
terms of projection of U.S. power overseas in addition to protecting its
own borders. This foreign projection has extended from military power
to taxing power. The United States also runs an enormous budget deficit.
Since it has one of the few “worldwide taxation” systems, the United
States has the power to locate all assets of all citizens that may produce
income to ensure compliance of its tax laws. The budget deficit puts
pressure on tax collectors to do so by any means necessary. This has lead
the United States to take the position, as in the UBS case, that U.S.
taxing authority trumps domestic legal authority in foreign jurisdictions
like Switzerland.
During the Iraq War, Belgian lawmakers took a similar position by
seeking to indict high-level U.S. government officials, including the
Secretary of Defense. On a financial level, nothing stands in the way of
another sovereign country passing laws, in the name of its national
interest, that would interfere with American citizens’ rights. In a world
that is increasingly connected, the United States cannot afford to
abrogate other countries’ laws, especially the laws of a friendly country
like Switzerland. After all, other countries could review the U.S. position
in the UBS case and determine they have the right to pass a law that its
citizens need not pay U.S. taxes on U.S. source income. If the United
States can effect a domestic law change that affects a foreign sovereign’s
domestic laws, there is no reason that another country could not do the
same to the United States. It is not in the United States’ national interest
to stand alone in the world with a position that it need not respect foreign
laws, but that other sovereign nations must respect U.S. laws.
ii. True purpose of the UBS case and effect
On the surface, the reason that the United States brought the UBS
case appears to have been to identify the names of American citizens
who had unreported foreign bank accounts overseas at UBS. The United
States, however, probably had a much broader purpose in bringing the
case. The broader purpose was probably to have a deterrent effect on
foreign banks and advisors who assist in creating or facilitating foreign
bank accounts. The myriad network of non-U.S. banks, other financial
institutions, advisors, and other facilitators (collectively referred to as the
“Network”) is so deep and vast that there is no way that the United States
could effectively bring actions and enforce its laws against even a small
fraction of the Network. As such, putting UBS personnel in prison and
exacting a very large fine against UBS was the first, and most important,
step in the process. Following that step, incentivizing U.S. taxpayers to
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voluntarily come forward was the next most important step because it
had the effect of making the Network aware that U.S. taxpayers may
come forward even without punishing the Network itself. The totality of
the U.S. attack is such that many foreign banks will no longer accept
American citizens as clients. Whereas the common wisdom offshore
used to be that the IRS could not reach foreign jurisdictions to reach the
Network, today the opposite conclusion is widely believed. Thus, as long
as the United States continues its attack, the deterrent goal will likely be
met.
Obviously, the more press the United States receives about cracking
down on offshore account holders and the Network, the more of a
deterrent effect there will be on American citizens who might otherwise
contemplate opening up an unreported foreign bank account. If the IRS
and the U.S. government are able get the names of U.S. accountholders
at UBS, this could be a very large weapon in the U.S. government’s
arsenal.243 Lastly, with increased scrutiny of offshore accounts, owners
may have limited access to their money.244
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States had a very important goal in bringing the UBS
case: deterring taxpayers from opening unreported foreign bank accounts
and deterring foreign banks and advisors from assisting U.S. taxpayers in
doing so. The PSI report spelled out that American citizens have made
extensive use of offshore tax havens to evade taxes, and that traditional
law enforcement is unable to control such misconduct.245 It makes sense
that the largest offshore banking jurisdiction with bank secrecy laws—
Switzerland—would be the initial target of the U.S. probe. In
conjunction with the criminal and civil probe of UBS, it also stands to
reason that the United States would seek to get a more favorable TIEA in
place with Switzerland.246
The problem with the United States’ attack on UBS is not its goals,
but rather its methods. The United States has traditionally been steadfast
in protecting itself from encroachment by laws of other sovereign nations
that contradict U.S. laws. Given this position, the United States appears
to be trying to have it both ways with the rest of the world—other
243
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countries must follow U.S. laws but they should not attempt to make the
United States follow their laws. Given this contradiction, it is
understandable that the Swiss are concerned that the United States is not
respecting Swiss domestic law. The United States, after all, has personal
jurisdiction over its own citizens, and therefore should be able to use
other means of tax enforcement that respect the domestic laws of another
sovereign country, especially Switzerland.
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